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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COMMERCIALIZATION OF MEDICAID

SIDNEY D. WATSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, I am an inner-city doctor working at the Upper Cardozo,
Community Health Center at 14th and Irving Streets in Washington, D.C., a
federally assisted, privately run, community-governed medical clinic. Our
neighborhood is made up of a large Central American community, a
Vietnamese enclave, an African-American population scattered throughout the
region, a mixture of refugees, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants
struggling to find someone to treat them despite their lack of money and
insurance. I have seen Ethiopians, Somalis, Kurds, West Africans, Chinese,
Afghanistanis, and Bosnians. Less than a quarter of our patients have
Medicaid, almost none have private insurance, and all are poor. Medical life
for our patients—like their lives in general—is not easy.
The majority of the patients at Cardozo are “self pay”—meaning they have
no insurance, no money, and can pay little or nothing. Put differently, if the
Cardozo health center didn’t continue to receive several million dollars a year
of federal funding based on the vintage 1960s Office of Economic Opportunity
idea of a community health center, there would be no payroll, no receptionists,
no nurses, no doctors, and no medical care. Grants for the treatment of AIDS
and the homeless as well as the Women, Infant and Childrens (WIC) Program
round out the budget at Cardozo. Government funding remains the operative
principle of health care finance in our neighborhood. Without the programs
legislated and managed by the federal government, there would be no medical
care at 14th and Irving. The commercial market hasn’t found our patients and
doesn’t seem to be looking for them.
Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan1

* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. A Mercer Law School Faculty Research
Grant supported this work. My thanks to the participants in the AALS Annual Meeting Poverty
Law Program and the Saint Louis University School of Law Health Law Symposium for
comments on earlier drafts of this work. I am grateful to Nateesha Gupte and Laura Bedingfield
for research help.
1. Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan, What One Doctor Learned: Going from Policy Making to Caring
for Real Patients at an Inner-City Clinic, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1998, at 31.
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Welcome to the world of welfare medicine: the world of poor people and
the health care professionals and institutions that serve them. Dr. Mullan
paints a graphic and accurate picture of the world of welfare medicine. Yet,
the commercial market has found some of welfare medicine’s patients—those
who have Medicaid. Today, sixty-four percent of Medicaid enrollees obtain
care through commercial HMOs—private, for-profit entities.2 This article is
about the promises and the pitfalls that accompany the commercial market’s
move into Medicaid and the world of welfare medicine.
Part II begins by describing the welfare medicine system: who gets welfare
medicine, who does welfare medicine, and how care for the poor is funded by
Medicaid and other sources. Part III traces the recent commercialization of
Medicaid, the move from a fee-for-service system to one dominated by
commercial managed care plans. Part IV exposes the false premises that
prompted the commercialization of Medicaid, while Part V explores the
dangers commercialization bodes for the larger world of welfare medicine.
Part VI returns to the world of welfare medicine, rethinking the role that
managed care and Medicaid can play in the larger context of welfare medicine.
II. WHAT IS WELFARE MEDICINE?
Welfare medicine is the health care system, or non-system, that serves poor
people. Welfare medicine is practiced at public hospitals, teaching hospitals,
and the few private, not-for-profit hospitals that remain in inner cities and other
places where large numbers of poor people live. It is care provided by clinics
and federally qualified health centers staffed by physicians and others with a
commitment to serve the poor.3 Although not all poor people use welfare
medicine, most poor people must rely on it for their care.
Who are the poor people who rely on welfare medicine? According to the
federal government, poor people are those who live at or below the federal
poverty guideline, $8350 for a single person, $11,250 for a couple and $14,150
for a family of three in the year 2000.4 This includes one of five U.S. children,5

2. SUZANNE FELT-LISK, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
THE CHANGING MEDICAID MANAGED CARE MARKET: TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL PLANS’
PARTICIPATION vi (1999), available at http://www.kff.org.
3. See Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community Based Health Care: A Legal and
Policy Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 248-60 (1997) (discussing the various entities that
provide care to poor people).
4. Annual Update of the Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg.
7555, 7555-56 (2000). The guidelines for Hawaii and Alaska are slightly higher. Id. at 7556.
5. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 1998
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/poverty98/pov98hi.html.
In 1998, 18.9% of children were poor. Id.
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one of ten seniors,6 and one of three persons with a disability.7 Most people
living in poverty are low-wage workers,8 and a decreasing number are welfare
recipients.9 While most poor people are white, disproportionate percentages
are racial and ethnic minorities. Twenty-six percent of African Americans and
twenty-five percent of Hispanics are poor compared with only ten percent of
whites.10 An increasing number of those who rely on welfare medicine are
recent immigrants.11
Welfare medicine is a separate, segregated system of care that continues
despite the enactment of Medicaid, America’s health insurance system for the
poor. Proponents of Medicaid envisioned it would end America’s dual system
of care; one system for poor people and another for those with private
insurance.12 However, this vision did not come to pass. Medicaid suffers from
the same limitations that plague any voucher system, be they health insurance
vouchers, housing vouchers or school vouchers.
First, Medicaid rates, particularly physician payment rates, do not compete
with private insurance and Medicare rates.
Medicaid fee-for-service
reimbursements average less than fifty percent of private insurance
6. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1998 B-6 tbl.B-2 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-270.pdf.
7. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, SURVEY PROGRAM ON PARTICIPATION AND
ATTITUDES 3 (2000), available at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html. A Harris Survey for the
National Organization on Disability found that among people of working age, eighteen to sixtyfour, only thirty-two percent with disabilities held full or part-time jobs, compared to eighty-one
percent of those without disabilities. It also showed that twenty-nine percent of people with
disabilities live in poverty (household incomes of $15,000 or less) compared to ten percent of
people without disabilities. And people with disabilities are much less likely to live in
households with incomes of more than $50,000 annually (sixteen percent versus thirty-nine
percent). Id. The full report is available at http://www.nod.org/attitides.html.
8. See POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at 17 tbl.3.
9. See MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, LOOKING AHEAD TO
REAUTHORIZATION OF TANF: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/LookingAheadtoReauthorization.htm
(showing
welfare
caseloads are down forty-three percent since Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
was enacted, and fifty percent since the peak caseloads in 1994); Marilyn R. Ellwod & Leighton
Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended Side Effects for Medicaid, HEALTH AFF.,
May 1998, at 137 (TANF caseloads dropped twenty-six percent from 1993 to 1997).
10. POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at vi tbl.A.
11. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IMMIGRANTS’
HEALTH CARE: COVERAGE AND ACCESS fig.18 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.; see also
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at ix (discussing poverty rates between
United States natives and non-natives).
12. Rand Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care–The Decline of the Medicaid Cure, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 643, 649-50 (1975); see also ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT ON MEDICAID,
MEDICAID: TRENDS AND OPTIONS, reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 40,371A,
at 31,464 (1992); John V. Jacobi, Mission and Markets in Health Care: Protecting Essential
Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1437-40 (1997).
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payments.13 Nationally, nearly one-quarter of physicians refuse to treat
Medicaid patients,14 and three-quarters of doctors who see Medicaid patients
severely limit their Medicaid practice, billing less than $10,000 a year to
Medicaid.15 A mere 5.5% of Medicaid participating physicians treat thirty-two
percent of Medicaid patients, while one-quarter of participating physicians
treat three-quarters of Medicaid patients.16
Second, the overwhelming majority of health care providers do not live
and work where poor people live and work.17 Caregiving professionals have
fled the inner city for areas with good schools, nice houses and fancy malls, to
avoid neighborhoods with high unemployment, substandard housing, violence
and poor schools.18 Medicaid helps fund welfare medicine where it is
practiced, but it has not kept health care providers from fleeing to the
suburbs.19
Third, welfare medicine requires a calling, a mission of service. Poor
people are sicker than others.20 The stress of low wages, high unemployment,
substandard housing, violence, and high food costs contribute to physical and
mental illness, and substance use.21 The stresses of poverty make it harder for
poor people to cooperate with care regimes. A special calling is required to
13. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 352 (1994).
14. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT UNDER
MEDICAID, REPORT TO CONGRESS (1991), reprinted in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) at
23 (1991) (noting that 23.7% of physicians do not treat Medicaid patients).
15. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, reprinted
in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) at 3, 278 (1991).
16. Janet B. Mitchell & Jerry Cromwell, Medicaid Mills: Fact or Fiction, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV., Summer 1980, at 41. Janet B. Mitchell & Jerry Cromwell, President’s Comm’n for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Access to
Private Physicians for Public Patients: Participation in Medicaid and Medicare, in SECURING
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 105, 107 (1982); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, ENSURING QUALITY IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 259
(1993).
17. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in Providing
Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1305, 1306 (1996) (noting that
poor urban communities with high proportions of African Americans and Hispanics show only
twenty-four physicians per 100,000 people); Katherine Huang, Graduate Medical Education: The
Federal Government’s Opportunity to Shape the Nation’s Physician Workforce, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 175, 179-80 (1999) (noting that the national average is 190 physicians per 100,000 people).
18. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION
175-76 (1999).
19. See id. at 175-81.
20. Good health correlates primarily with higher socioeconomic status; poor health
correlates directly with poverty. Marianne Foley & Glen R. Johnson, Health Care of Blacks in
American Inner Cities, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND
PROSPECTS 211, 212 (1987).
21. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right
Question, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1647 (1993) (discussing the interaction between race and health care).
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care for people who have difficulty following instructions and who often miss
follow-up appointments. Practicing welfare medicine requires a sense of
mission to learn to care for those from vastly different racial, ethnic and
socioeconomic backgrounds. Some caregivers and institutions are drawn to
the practice of medicine by this passion; most are not.22
Welfare medicine cares for those with Medicaid, but it also treats an even
larger number of people without health insurance.23 Medicaid insures almost
forty-one million poor and near poor people: children and some parents,
pregnant women, those who are permanently and totally disabled, and the
elderly.24 The new state Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) covers
an additional 1.8 million children.25 Together, Medicaid and CHIP cover 42.8
million Americans. However, this number includes only forty-four percent of
Americans with incomes at or below the federal poverty line.26 An even larger
number of Americans, forty-four million, eighteen percent of the population,
remain uninsured.27 In today’s world of welfare medicine, for every Medicaid
patient there is an uninsured patient.
Moreover, no clear distinction exists between patients who have Medicaid
and those who are uninsured. Today’s Medicaid patient is tomorrow’s
uninsured.28 Some people, primarily the poor elderly and the severely
disabled, maintain their Medicaid status for years. For most people, though,
Medicaid eligibility comes and goes. A pregnant woman is eligible for
Medicaid while she is pregnant, but four months after delivery she is likely to
be ineligible because income limits for parents are less than a third of those for
pregnant women and infants.29 A mother with children can get Medicaid while
22. The same is true in the practice of law where a special cadre of lawyers practice public
defense in the criminal system and legal services on the civil side.
23. The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751, 760
(1997).
24. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID
ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING TRENDS 1 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/content/
archive/2113.2113.pdf. In 1997, 40.6 million people were enrolled in Medicaid. Id.
25. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, CHIP PROGRAM
ENROLLMENT: DECEMBER 1998 TO DECEMBER 1999 7 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.
26. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR
SELECTED POPULATIONS fig.7 (1997), available at http://www.kff.org.
27. CATHERINE HOFFMAN & ALAN SCHLOBOHM, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: A CHART BOOK
10 (2000).
28. One year after leaving welfare and Medicaid forty-nine percent of women and twentynine percent of children were uninsured. Id. at 51.
29. Although parents of children are categorically eligible for Medicaid, on average, a
mother earning more than forty-one percent of the federal poverty line, which was $5802 in 2000,
makes too much money to qualify. In contrast, the income guidelines for pregnant women range
from 133% to 185% of the federal poverty guideline, depending upon the state. In 2000, a
pregnant woman in a three-person family would be eligible for Medicaid as long as the family’s
income falls below $18,820 or $26,178. See HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 48.
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she is unemployed, but becomes uninsured when she gets a minimum wage job
without health insurance that puts her, but not the children, over Medicaid’s
income guidelines.30 Fluidity reigns in a system in which most people who
lose Medicaid become uninsured.31 Lack of insurance abounds in a system in
which more than eighty percent of the uninsured are connected to the
workforce, either as workers or their dependents who are not offered or cannot
afford employer-provided coverage, but make too much money to qualify for
Medicaid.32
Welfare medicine is a system financed almost exclusively by government
dollars. Despite the talk about cost-shifting between private insurance and
welfare care, in reality, most welfare medicine providers have few, if any,
privately insured patients to whom they can shift costs.33 The government,
through Medicaid, Medicare, and other programs, shoulders almost half the
cost of U.S. health care.34 Medicaid, the safety net for poor people, costs the
federal government over ninety billion dollars a year and the states over
seventy billion dollars.35 The federal government is the single largest
purchaser of maternity care, nursing home and other long term care services,36
and the single most important source of funding for welfare medicine
caregivers.
30. See id. at 49 (indicating that in thirty-two states a parent who works full-time for
minimum wage is not eligible for Medicaid).
31. See Bowen Garrett & John Holahan, Health Insurance Coverage After Welfare, HEALTH
AFF., Jan. 2000, at 175, 177 (noting that forty-one percent of former female welfare recipients
were uninsured in 1997); see also HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 51 (indicating that
forty-nine percent of women and twenty-nine percent of children were uninsured one year after
leaving welfare’s Medicaid benefits).
32. HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 12. Three quarters of the uninsured are in
families with at least one full-time worker. Almost twenty percent are in families with two fulltime workers. Almost sixty percent of low-wage workers do not have employer based health
coverage. Id. While almost half, forty-five percent, were not offered insurance, thirteen percent
declined coverage because of cost. Id. at 46.
33. See The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, supra note 23, at 760-61.
Only twelve percent of public hospital patients have private insurance; at urban community health
centers 14.3% of patients are privately insured. Id. at n.84. See also PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 33 (1995).
34. See LARRY LEVITT & JANET LUNDY, THE KAISER CHANGING HEALTH CARE
MARKETPLACE PROJECT, TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE
MARKETPLACE: CHART BOOK 8 (1998), available at http://www.kff.org. Government programs
account for 46.7% of national health expenditures. Id.
35. In 1997, the federal cost was $90.8 billion while the state cost was $70.4 billion. THE
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1 (1999),
available at http://www.kff.org.
36. In 1995, Medicaid paid for thirty-nine percent of the births in the U.S. and financed
forty-seven percent of nursing home costs and thirty-eight percent of long-term care expenses.
Id. at 2.
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In addition to insuring patients, Medicaid and Medicare support welfare
medicine for the uninsured through reimbursement enhancements. Medicaid
and Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments help support
institutions that care for large numbers of publicly insured and uninsured
patients.37 Medicaid and Medicare graduate medical education money, while
not earmarked for indigent care, help fund the welfare medicine practiced by
academic medical centers.38 The historic system of cost-based Medicaid
reimbursement for federally qualified community health clinics was designed
to support their mission to serve the uninsured.39
As important as Medicaid is to welfare medicine, a patchwork of federal
and state programs contribute almost as many dollars.40 A plethora of federal
block grants provide states with money for child and maternal health, mental
health care, alcohol and substance abuse, and other specialized health
programs.41 The federal government funds Ryan White programs to provide
direct medical care and prescription drugs to people with HIV.42 The federal
Health Care for the Homeless program pays for outreach and health services to
Indian Health Service supports care for Native
homeless people.43

37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 412.106 (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(10)(A)(ii)(XIII) (1998); see generally TERESA A. COGHLIN & DAVID LISKA, THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, THE MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENT PROGRAM:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (1997) (discussing DSH payments), available at
http://www.urban.org.
38. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
528-42 (1997).
39. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 3, at 265-67.
40. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
41. For a partial listing of federal block grant funds, see Federal Money Retriever, Federal
Government Funding: Maternal and Child Health, at http://www.fedmoney.com/grants/
su0159.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2000).
42. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (Supp. II 1990)). Title II of
the act provides funding to states to provide HIV care to uninsured, underinsured and low-income
people living with HIV. In 1999, services provided through the CARE Act reached about
400,000 individuals. About $6.4 billion has been appropriated for the CARE Act since its
inception. Almost $965.5 million of this amount has been allocated to ADAP funds to allow
states to purchase HIV treatment drugs. HIV and AIDS: US DHHS Funds Ryan White Act (June
20, 1999), at http://www.hivandhepatitis.com/hiv/rnhiv6_20_99_04.htm.
43. In 1987, Congress enacted Title VI of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act, authorizing grants for the provision of health care to homeless individuals. Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1988)). In 1998, grants were awarded to 128 community-based
organizations that, in turn, expanded their service network through arrangements with over 300
health care providers. In that year, the HCH programs served more than 430,000 clients
nationwide. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HEALTH CARE AT HOMELESSNESS 2
(1999), at http://nch.ari.net/health.html.
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Americans.44 The Veterans Health Administration offers inpatient, outpatient,
respite and long term care services to poor veterans.45 Public mental health
systems, both inpatient and outpatient services, are primarily funded by state
dollars.46 State and local grants and tax dollars support public hospitals, public
clinics and private not-for-profit providers that treat the uninsured.47
Government funding for this hodge-podge of programs comprises 12.8% of
national health expenditures, compared to 14.3% spent on Medicaid.48
While the numbers help illustrate the size and scope of welfare medicine,
they cannot paint the human picture. Community health clinics, like Dr.
Mullan’s Cardozo Community Health Center in Washington, D.C., have a long
tradition of compassionate, high quality care.49 Other government funded
welfare medicine programs offer inspiring models of medical care at its best.50
Throughout the country, concerned, committed and highly skilled caregivers
work in welfare medicine.51
However, welfare medicine can also be dysfunctional. Welfare medicine
breaks down when the community clinic does not have evening hours or an
after-hours phone line, and the hospital, which runs the clinic and receives over
seventeen million dollars a year for indigent care, garnishes the minimum
wage salary of a young mother who forgot, in the midst of a nighttime medical
crisis, to bring her two year old son’s Medicaid card with her to the emergency

44. See Indian Health Service Internet Home Page, http://www.ihs.gov (last modified Sept.
8, 2000).
45. See VETERANS BENEFITS AND SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
GATEWAY TO VA HEALTH CARE 1, at http://www.va.gov/vbs/health/index.htm (last modified
July 28, 2000).
46. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 4 (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/chapter6/sec2.html.
47. See JACK A. MEYER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN FINANCING SAFETY NET HOSPITALS: HOUSTON, OAKLAND, AND MIAMI 9-10
(1999), available at http://www.urban.org (quantifying local support to public hospitals in three
communities); see also The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, supra note 23,
at 761 (indicating that in 1991, nearly eighteen percent of public hospital revenues came from
local government subsidies).
48. LEVITT & LUNDY, supra note 34, at 8. See also The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care
on the Uninsured, supra note 23, at 762 (thirty-five percent of the funding for community health
centers comes from government and foundation grants).
49. SARA ROSENBAUM & ANNE DIEVLER, A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE COMMUNITY
AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTER PROGRAMS 12-13, 35 (1992), available at http://gwis.circ.gwu.
edu/~chsrp/rp.html.
50. See, e.g., PEDRO JOSE GREEG, JR., WAKING UP IN AMERICAN 180-89 (1999); see also
Howard Larkin, Community Care Gets Competitive, 40 AM. MED. NEWS 7, 7-9 (1997)
(describing the example of the 16th Street Community Health Center in Milwaukee).
51. See, e.g., DAVID HILKIKER, NOT ALL OF USE ARE SAINTS: A DOCTOR’S JOURNEY WITH
THE POOR 1 (1994).
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room.52 Welfare medicine is myopic when Medicaid pays for nursing home
care for a forty-seven year old woman with cerebral palsy, but will not cover
the cost of the attendant care that would allow her to live in the community.53
Welfare medicine fails when Medicaid pays for psychiatric hospitalizations to
save a homeless woman diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia when she
crashes, but will not reimburse the services of an Assertive Community
Treatment Team, an interdisciplinary outreach team, that can provide the
psychiatric, social and medical services needed to help her remain stable and
become housed.54
This is welfare medicine, health care for poor people, both its
accomplishments and its shortcomings. At its core, welfare medicine remains
a segregated system funded by state and federal money. Medicaid pays for
much of welfare medicine, but a patchwork of other government programs
play a significant role as do federal, state and local tax subsidies. However,
changes in Medicaid are affecting all of welfare medicine.
III. COMMERCIALIZATION OF MEDICAID
Medicaid has changed. What was once a fee-for-service system financed
with government dollars and delivered by public and private not-for-profit
institutions has morphed into a managed care system dominated by for-profit
entities. Forty-eight states use managed care for at least some Medicaid
recipients, only rural Alaska and Wyoming have no recipients enrolled in
managed care.55 Nationwide, fifty-four percent of Medicaid recipients are
enrolled in managed care, up from less than ten percent in 1991.56 Twelve
states have more than seventy-five percent of their Medicaid enrollees in
managed care.57 Sixty-four percent of Medicaid enrollees receive managed
care in commercial Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).58
Medicaid managed care is accomplished in two ways. Some states use
primary care case management systems (PCCM) to match beneficiaries with

52. Confidential memorandum from Sidney Watson, to the File 1 (May 8, 1999) (on file
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal).
53. Debbie Rhyne, Looking For a Home: Mary Hicks is Going to Court to Get Out of a
Nursing Home, THE MACON TELEGRAPH, July 30, 2000, at A1.
54. See Sidney D. Watson, Discharges to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness, 19 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author).
55. MARSHA REGENSTEIN & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (1998), available at http://www.urban.org.
56. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND MANAGED
CARE fig.1 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org (noting that in 1998, 53.6% of Medicaid
enrollees were in managed care compare with 9.5% in 1991).
57. Marsha Gold & Anna Aizer, Growing An Industry: How Managed is TennCare’s
Managed Care?, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2000, at 86.
58. FELT-LISK, supra note 2, at 17.
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primary care physicians who coordinate the patient’s care and serve as
gatekeepers to specialty and inpatient services.59 These PCCM gatekeepers are
generally paid a monthly case management fee with all other services paid on a
fee-for-service basis.60 Most states, though, contract with managed care
organizations (MCOs) paying them a monthly capitation payment on behalf of
each enrollee to provide a specified package of benefits.61
States rushed into Medicaid managed care primarily for financial reasons.
First, and foremost, states saw Medicaid managed care as a cost containment
strategy.62 Managed care’s rhetoric of competition and cost-effectiveness
promised to do what state policy makers had been unable to do, stop the
growth in Medicaid spending by using “the market as the toughest regulator.”
Moreover, capitated Medicaid managed care shifts the risk of Medicaid cost
increases from state budgets to the managed care contractor.
States also rushed into commercial Medicaid managed care because the
commercial HMOs came calling. For years, the private HMO industry
shunned Medicaid because it was unprofitable: reimbursement was low, and,
as long as enrollment was voluntary, few Medicaid recipients opted for
managed care.63 However, in the early 1990s, the Clinton administration
began granting waivers of federal Medicaid freedom of choice requirements so
states could force Medicaid recipients into managed care.64 Since 1997, the
Balanced Budget Act allows states to require most Medicaid enrollees to
participate in managed care without obtaining federal approval.65 With almost
eleven percent of the U.S. population enrolled in Medicaid, commercial HMOs
saw a better business opportunity.66

59. REGENSTEIN & ANTHONY, supra note 55, at 3.
60. See id.
61. See id.; John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, HEALTH AFF.
May 1998, at 43, 51 (two-thirds of Medicaid managed care enrollees are in risk-bearing MCOs).
62. Id. at 45.
63. Holahan, supra note 61, at 52; see generally ROSENBLATT, supra note 12.
64. See Colleen A. Foley, The Doctor Will See You Now: Medicaid Managed Care and
Indigent Children, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 93, 99, 116, 121 (1997); see also Sidney D. Watson,
Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty and Physician Self-Interest, 11 AM. J.L. &
MED. 191, 203-04 (1995) (discusssing the story of Tennessee’s Medicaid waiver); Vernellia
Randall et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing the State Applications, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1069 (1996) (reviewing and comparing state Medicaid waivers granted by the
Clinton administration).
65. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 489 (1997) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1397u-2 (Supp. IV 1998)). The BBA allows states to make managed care mandatory
without a federal waiver except for those who are eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare and
children with special needs. The BBA also mandates requirements for managed care enrollment
procedures and choice of plans. It also requires that states establish Medicaid managed care
access standards and procedures for monitoring quality and appropriateness of care. Id.
66. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 52.
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Moreover, the timing was right for commercial Medicaid managed care
because managed care was exploding in the private sector. Insurance
companies like Cigna, Aetna and Blue Cross/Blue Shield were organizing forprofit HMOs to take advantage of new managed care opportunities in the
private sector. These commercial, for-profit HMOs now dominate the private
HMO market, accounting for sixty-three percent of enrollees and seventy-five
percent of plans.67 They have the administrative infrastructure to operate
managed care systems. Expanding into the growing Medicaid managed care
field seemed like a promising business opportunity.
Using commercial HMOs to deliver Medicaid services coincides with two
important trends: a societal trend to privatize government services, and a health
care trend toward corporatization. Throughout government, a move is afoot to
use private contractors to provide services traditionally offered by public
schools, prisons and the cash welfare system.68 Medicaid has always relied on
private institutions and caregivers to deliver medical services. Medicaid has
even used private corporations, like Ross Perot’s Electronic Data Systems
(EDS) for utilization review and claims processing.69 It is an easy next step to
draw private actors into designing Medicaid’s delivery system and to morph
from fee-for-service Medicaid into managed care.
In addition, health care is becoming corporatized. Public hospitals are
closing or converting to private status.70 Many communities have seen their
not-for-profit hospitals become for-profit entities.71 Commercial insurers and
HMOs dominate the insurance and managed care fields, and even Blue
67. Sylvia Fubini, 2000 Industry Outlook, HEALTHCARE TRENDS REP., Jan. 2000, at 7-8.
68. See generally Barbara Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor into Gold: How Corporations Seek
to Profit from Welfare Reform, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 44.
69. See, e.g., STATE OF GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, DIVISION OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDER MANUALS 1-2 pt.1 (n.d.). In Georgia, a number of different
private entities handle various administrative functions for Medicaid. Electronic Data Systems
(EDS), a for-profit corporation, provides claims processing, provider enrollment, prior approval
for some services, and determines eligibility for nursing home services. A different corporation,
First Health Services, handles prior approvals and other functions related to pharmaceuticals. Yet
another private entity, Georgia Medical Care Foundation, handles prior approval of physician
services. Yet other private entities have responsibility for peer review and utilization review. See
id. at 13.
70. See generally Phyllis E. Bernard, Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: Implications
for Access and Indigent Care, 47 MERCER L. REV. 991 (1996) (discussing various corporate
models for restructuring public hospitals); THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUBLIC HOSPITALS–A
PRESCRIPTION FOR SURVIVAL 1 (1996), at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/minority/siegelbf.as.
71. See generally Gary J. Young & Kamal R. Desai, Nonprofit Hospital Conversions and
Community Benefits: New Evidence from Three States, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 1999, at 146
(discussing the conversion of nonprofit hospitals that come under the control of a for-profit
company); Jack Needleman et al., Hospital Conversion Trends, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1997 at 187
(presenting information on the extent, geographic distribution, and other issues related to hospital
conversions).
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Cross/Blue Shield has become a for-profit firm.72 The stampede to corporate
status even includes doctors who are more and more likely to be employees or
shareholders of increasingly large group practices.73
Not only was the time right for commercial HMOs to enter Medicaid,
Medicaid managed care, particularly when delivered by commercial HMOs,
offers exciting possibilities. Commercial HMOs offer the allure of finally
achieving the single-tier health care system that the original proponents of
Medicaid sought: one managed care plan for both privately insured people and
those with Medicaid. Commercial managed care also offers a vehicle to
overcome the chronic deficiencies of Medicaid. Medicaid enrollees have faced
persistent problems in accessing primary care. Commercial HMOs offer to
link Medicaid recipients with a physician or other primary care provider who
can provide ongoing preventive and primary services.74 Many Medicaid
recipients and their advocates hailed managed care as a cure for what ails
Medicaid.75
The result of this confluence of events is that commercial managed care
now dominates Medicaid. For-profit HMOs serve six million of the 9.3
million people in Medicaid managed care, sixty-four percent of enrollees.76
Commercial HMOs have arrived and Medicaid has changed.
IV. FALSE PREMISES AND FALSE PROMISES
Although commercial HMOs are now a mainstay of Medicaid managed
care, the courting ritual between states and commercial entities is fraught with
rose colored glasses, flirtation and even tomfoolery. At bottom, the
commercialization of Medicaid is based on false premises that doom the
experiment for failure.
First, Medicaid managed care cannot deliver the cost savings that states
expect. As Sarah Rosenbaum says: “The Medicaid managed care revolution
responded to a phantom problem.”77 In the early and mid 1990s, states were
reeling from explosive Medicaid cost increases. From 1988 to 1993, Medicaid

72. See, e.g., Fubini, supra note 67, at 7 (stating that for profit HMOs account for 64.2% of
all HMO enrollment).
73. See id. at 13 (noting that the size of physician practices has increased significantly in the
past thirty years).
74. James W. Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Back-Off Not Backlash in Medicaid Managed
Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1159, 1161 (1999).
75. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 44-46; see generally Watson, supra note 64.
76. FELT-LISK, supra note 2, at 17.
77. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, Address at the Saint Louis University Health
Law Symposium (Mar. 31, 2000) (transcript available with the Saint Louis University Law
Journal).
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costs grew almost twenty percent per year.78 From 1993 to 1995, the growth
slowed, but still averaged nine to ten percent annually.79 States are desperate
to put the brakes on, but these cost increases cannot be controlled by managed
care techniques.
Two factors primarily contributed to the staggering growth in Medicaid
costs. One, eligibility expansions substantially increased the size of Medicaid
rolls.80 Two, much of the rest of the growth resulted from clever state
manipulation of reimbursement rules for payments to disproportionate share
hospitals and the shifting of state mental health and mental retardation costs to
Medicaid.81 Altering service delivery patterns via managed care cannot
reverse these cost increases. Cost increases can, and have been, halted by
drops in Medicaid eligibility and reductions in disproportionate share
funding.82
Second, Medicaid is not a program with a great deal of fat. Medicaid feefor-service reimbursement rates average less than half that of private insurance
rates.83 Medicaid’s administrative overhead is less than five percent.84 Such a
lean program leaves little room, if any, for further cost reductions. Estimates
indicate that managed care may, at best, reduce Medicaid costs by five to ten
percent.85
Even if Medicaid managed care can reduce the costs of services per
enrollee, overall program costs are unlikely to show significant savings
because the groups being enrolled—parents and children—use relatively few
services. Although parents and children make up almost seventy-five percent
of Medicaid enrollees, they use only twenty-five percent of Medicaid
services.86 Even if Medicaid managed care can produce a five to ten percent
78. MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note 35, at 5. Between 1988 and 1993, Medicaid spending
grew at an average annual rate of 19.6%. Id.
79. MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 24, at 2.
80. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 74, at 1160.
81. Id.; John Holahan & David Liska, The Slowdown in Medicaid Spending Growth: Will it
Continue?, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1997, at 157-58.
82. See id. at 157; BRIAN BRUEN & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SLOW
GROWTH IN MEDICAID SPENDING CONTINUES IN 1997 1, 4 (1999), available at www.urban.org/
health/slow_growth_medicaid.pdf.
83. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
84. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 725
(1997). Administrative overhead is 5.5% in large group markets and twenty-five percent in small
group markets. This means that overhead is similar between Medicaid and similarly sized
programs. Id.
85. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 46.
86. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, at 1 fig.1 (1999) (parents and children comprise seventy-three percent
of enrollees and use 25.1% of expenditures), available at http://www.kff.org. Their average
yearly per enrollee cost is only $741 for children and $1874 for parents. In contrast, the aged use
on average $10,804 per year, and those with disabilities use $8841 a year. Id.
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savings, which many doubt, as long as enrollment efforts focus on parents and
children, the overall program savings will be an uninspiring 1.2 to 2.5%.87 A
savings, but no panacea either.
Third, managed care theory, saving money by using preventive medicine
and well care rather than paying for expensive high end care after people get
sick, does not work with Medicaid because of its byzantine eligibility criteria.
It is impossible to use Medicaid services to prevent people from getting sick
when childless adults only qualify for Medicaid after they are “permanently
and totally disabled.”88 Under Medicaid rules, a person with HIV or any other
progressive or chronic disease cannot qualify to get the drugs that will keep her
healthy and in the workforce.89 Medicaid is available only after people are too
sick to work and need acute or end stage care.
Moreover, many Medicaid enrollees move on and off Medicaid rolls
making continuity of care and preventive care impossible. Nearly half of
Medicaid enrollees lose their coverage within one year and seventy percent are
out of the program within two years.90 In a study of California and Florida’s
Medicaid programs, one-quarter to one-third of enrollees left Medicaid during
the year.91 Another seven to ten percent went off Medicaid and returned
during the year, a phenomenon called churning.92 Some people lose Medicaid
eligibility because they begin earning too much money. Others, like pregnant
women, no longer fit into one of Medicaid’s categorical eligibility
pigeonholes. Whatever the reason, most Medicaid enrollees who lose
Medicaid become uninsured.93 When the commercial HMO only serves
Medicaid and privately insured patients, the newly uninsured patient is out of
luck. She has no ongoing source of care and must begin navigating the welfare
system of care, public hospitals and public clinics, to find someone who will
treat her.
Fourth, commercial HMOs have no experience practicing welfare
medicine. Cigna, Aetna, Blue Cross/Blue Shield and other commercial HMOs
have built a track record providing services to large employer groups.
Commercial health care, the brand the middle class receives, does not work

87. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 46.
88. To qualify for Medicaid, adults must either be “permanently and totally disabled” or
caretaker parents. Most adults on Medicaid qualify because of their status as a parent or other
caretaker. MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note 35, at 3.
89. See id.
90. Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Managed Care and High Quality Can We Have Both?, 278
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1617, 1621 (1997).
91. MARILYN R. ELLWOOD & KIMBALL LEWIS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ON AND OFF
MEDICAID: ENROLLMENT PATTERNS FOR CALIFORNIA AND FLORIDA IN 1995 2 (1999), available
at http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/occa27.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Epstein, supra note 90, at 1621.
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well for poor people. Commercial HMOs provide a fairly standard set of
medical benefits: inpatient and outpatient care, and prescription drugs. They
set up daytime office hours with telephone numbers for after-hours service and
assume that enrollees can take care of the rest of their lives. People with
private insurance tend to have houses, stable jobs, and support from family,
friends and co-workers. Many poor people, though, do not have jobs, housing,
telephones, reliable transportation or support networks.
Commercial HMOs simply do not know how to practice and administer
welfare medicine. They do not have systems for helping a homeless man who,
after having his life saved by $30,000 to $40,000 of ICU treatment, no longer
needs acute care hospital services, but has no place to go upon discharge but to
the street.94 Commercial insurers have no experience creating networks to
treat a woman with diabetes who needs insulin but does not have a refrigerator
in which to keep it. Commercial HMOs are set up to deliver a discrete set of
medical benefits. They do not have experience in the world of welfare
medicine, which requires integrating medical and social services.
Moreover, commercial HMOs have little, if any, experience treating the
elderly and disabled who, although they make up only about twenty-five
percent of Medicaid recipients, use sixty-five percent of Medicaid services.95
These enrollees include people with AIDS, children with mental retardation
and developmental disabilities, people with severe mental illness and others
with chronic alcohol and substance abuse problems.96 Commercial HMOs
have little experience with these diseases and the specialized providers who
treat them.97 Commercial HMOs focus on acute care services. The elderly and
those with disabilities need more long-term care: nursing home care, home
health services and mental health treatment.98
In addition, commercial HMOs are unlikely to have providers in their
networks that practice where welfare patients seek care. Commercial HMOs
94. See LISBETH B. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF
DISADVANTAGE 137 (1988).
95. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supra note 86, at 1 fig.1. The elderly comprise
10.1% of Medicaid enrollees. Those with disabilities account for 16.8%. Id. However, the
elderly use 27.6% of expenditures while the disabilities use 37.5%. Id.
96. See MARSHA REGENSTEIN & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (1998), available at
http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/occa11.pdf; see also Foley, supra note 64, at 128-29
(discussing the problems of disabled children and others).
97. See, e.g., John A. Flippen, The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment
Program and Managed Medicaid Mental Health Care: The Need to Reevaluate the EPSDT in the
Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1997) (discussing the special needs of people with
mental illness and special service package Medicaid provides for children).
98. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 49, 63 n.22. Medicaid has covered services not offered
by most commercial plans, including substance abuse treatment, mental health care,
rehabilitation, home and personal care, and case management. Id.
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market to employers who are likely to have enrollees who live in suburbs and
exurbs where few poor people live. Commercial HMOs create networks of
primary physicians who are easily accessible to enrollees. These practitioners,
like their patients, live beyond the neighborhoods with high concentrations of
Medicaid patients. Geographically, these HMO network providers are unlikely
to practice welfare medicine.
Finally, it is becoming clearer that commercial entities may not be willing
to stay in the Medicaid managed care market for the long haul. A few years
ago, the commercial HMOs came to Medicaid managed care in droves; now
they are leaving in droves.99 One-third of states have seen commercial HMOs
withdraw from the Medicaid market.100 Aetna has left New York and
Connecticut.101 Utah cannot find a commercial HMO to bid on Medicaid.102
New York City’s Medicaid program has only five commercial HMOs left,103
and in the Bronx only one commercial Medicaid HMO remains.104 Ohio has
only one commercial HMO serving its Medicaid enrollees.105 In Tennessee,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the state’s largest Medicaid contractor, renegotiated its
TennCare contract so it is no longer a full risk-bearing HMO.106
As commercial HMOs abandon the Medicaid ship, often the only Medicaid
managed care entities left behind are welfare HMOs: HMOs whose members
have Medicaid, Medicare, or other government coverage, rather than private
insurance.107 Today, the fastest growing category of Medicaid managed care is
the “Medicaid only” plan, one in which seventy-five percent or more of

99. See Leigh Page, More Commercial Plans Leave Medicaid, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 2330, 1999, at 13. See also THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE fig.4 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org; FELT-LISK, supra
note 2, at 10 (commercial plans withdrew from the Medicaid market more often and entered it
less often in 1997 and 1998, compared with previous years. Between 1996 and 1997, more than
twice as many commercial plans withdrew from Medicaid as the year before).
100. Commercial Insurers Shun Medicaid Market: Is it a Bailout or a Shakeout? Nobody’s
Sure—Yet, ST. HEALTH WATCH, Nov. 1998, at 1, 4.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id.
104. A Most Dangerous Game: Medicaid Plans and States Rely Exclusively on Each Other
for Payments, Enrollees, ST. HEALTH WATCH , Feb. 1999, at 3.
105. Amy Goldstein, Managed-Care Medicaid Experiment Fails in Ohio, WASH. POST, Aug.
14, 1999, at A8.
106. Tennessee: HCFA Approves Risk-Sharing Plans as Part of TennCare Overhaul Effort, 9
BNA HEALTH L. REP. 1141 (2000). The TennCare program now assumes risk for Medicaid costs
and Blue Cross receives a bonus if it keeps costs within a specified range. Id. See also Not Yet
Singing the Blues–TennCare Officials Say Plan’s Departure Won’t Kill the Program, ST.
HEALTH WATCH, Feb. 2000, at 1.
107. For example, in the Bronx Health Plan, Medicaid covers eighty percent of its members
and other government programs cover twenty percent. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104,
at 3.
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enrollees are Medicaid recipients.108 Over forty percent of Medicaid managed
care enrollees are in “Medicaid only” plans.109 From 1992 to 1996, the
percentage of welfare HMOs participating in Medicaid managed care grew
from eleven to eighteen percent.110
At a minimum, the exodus of commercial HMOs and the emergence of
welfare HMOs dash hopes that Medicaid managed care will mainstream those
on Medicaid. Welfare HMOs return Medicaid recipients to the segregated
world of welfare medicine. Segregated care may have its advantages. Many
welfare HMOs have networks of long time safety net providers with enviable
records of providing quality care based upon their knowledge of welfare
medicine. They have a cadre of committed providers and long-term experience
providing care to poor people. This background means that many welfare
HMOs have the three characteristics that appear most important in predicting
successful Medicaid HMO performance: competence, commitment and
stability.111 However, welfare HMOs create other risks.
Many welfare HMOs are organized, sponsored and financed by traditional
safety net providers, public and private not-for-profit hospitals and clinics who
historically practiced welfare medicine.112 These institutional providers have
always struggled with low Medicaid reimbursement rates and the need to cover
the costs of caring for the uninsured. Now though, Medicaid managed care has
forced them to become risk bearers as well. As welfare HMOs they are
reimbursed by Medicaid on a per enrollee capitation rate that, generally, does
not take into account that their other welfare patients, often half their patient
load, are uninsured.113
Welfare HMOs risk insolvency and communities risk losing their welfare
medicine system. In 1997, seventy percent of welfare HMOs lost money,
while only eleven percent showed a profit.114 In contrast, forty-three percent
of commercial HMOs enrolled in Medicaid made money, even though fifty108. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 74, at 1165.
109. Id.
110. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, at 3. In 1992 10.8% of Medicaid MCOs were
welfare HMOs; in 1996 the number was 17.8%. Id. Prior to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
states had to have federal approval to enroll Medicaid recipients in managed care plans that had
more than seventy-five percent Medicaid enrollees. However, the 72/25 rule, as it was known,
was repealed in 1997 allowing Medicaid-only plans. Sylvia Fubini, 1999 Industry Outlook,
HEALTHCARE TRENDS REP., Jan. 1999, at 14.
111. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, at 4. See also Bruce E. Landon & Arnold M.
Epstein, Quality Management Practices in Medicaid Managed Care: A National Survey of
Medicaid and Commercial Health Plans Participating in the Medicaid Program, 282 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1769, 1770 (1999) (welfare HMOs are more likely to provide targeted services to
meet the special needs of Medicaid patients).
112. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 58.
113. See text accompanying notes 23-27, 41-48.
114. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, at 3.
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seven percent showed a loss.115 Although it is too early to predict how welfare
HMOs will fare financially, the warning signs signal caution.116
Examination of commercial Medicaid managed care reveals false
promises. Medicaid managed care is unlikely to dramatically lower costs.
Without substantial guidance and training, commercial HMOs are unlikely to
know enough about welfare medicine to improve the quality of care for the
poor. Moreover, the experiment is dangerous. The influx and outflow of
commercial HMOs are likely to harm patients who end up floundering from
one system to the next. The entrance and exit of commercial HMOs is also
likely to leave traditional welfare providers in an even more precarious
financial position than they were when fee-for-service Medicaid populated the
world. Medicaid enrollees are likely to be drawn through a short period of
commercial Medicaid managed care only to find themselves dropped back into
an even more distinctly two-tiered medical care system than the one which
existed before the advent of commercial Medicaid HMOs.
V. RETHINKING WELFARE MEDICINE
Transplanting commercial HMOs into Medicaid does not cure what ails
Medicaid and welfare medicine. Commercial HMOs are unlikely to have the
networks or the know-how to deliver the specialized medical and social care
that welfare medicine requires. However, the graver danger posed by the
commercialization of Medicaid is that by focusing too narrowly on
transplanting commercial HMOs into Medicaid, we have lost an opportunity to
think creatively about welfare medicine and Medicaid and managed care’s role
in it.
Managed care is fast becoming the curse word of medicine, yet managed
care methodology, or what might more accurately be termed “managing care,”
has much to offer Medicaid and welfare medicine. The term “managed care”
refers to many different organizational arrangements,117 but is often popularly
associated with systems of overzealous cost cutting. However, managed care
when done responsibly, offers to integrate the financing and delivery of
welfare medicine care. MCOs contract to create systems of care. The MCO
agrees to furnish the enrollee with a specific package of services and providers
to deliver those services for a preset fee, usually a capitation rate or a global
budget.118
115. Id.
116. See generally SUZANNE FELT-LISK, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLES OF MEDICAID-DOMINATED MANAGED CARE
PLANS v (2000), available at http://www.kff.org (discussing the financial risk of Medicaiddominated plans in thirteen states)
117. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A
Literature Analysis, 271 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1512, 1512 (1994).
118. Id.
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Under this contractual system, managed care offers possibilities for what
ails welfare medicine and Medicaid. The historic fee-for-service Medicaid
system is often dysfunctional. It pays providers to treat people after they get
sick rather than keeping them well. It fails to attract sufficient physicians. It
encourages a welfare medicine system that relies too heavily on hospital
emergency rooms and outpatient clinics that provide episodic care. It often
does not cover the types of care the aged and people with disabilities most
need and want, like home health services and community based mental health
care.
Managed care creates the framework to begin reconstructing welfare
medicine. Managed care promises to move care out of the emergency room,
where continuity of care and an ongoing provider-patient relationship is
impossible, and to match enrollees with a primary care provider who will help
the patient get preventive care to stay well or, for those with chronic or severe
illness, to live as full and functional a life as possible. Capitated or global
payments can relieve welfare medicine and Medicaid from the financial
constraints of a medical insurance model. Managed care creates a financial
structure capable of providing poor people, particularly the elderly and those
with disabilities, with the mix of medical and social services they need to lead
healthier, more productive lives.
Programs that incorporate capitated payments have shown enormous
potential for improving welfare medicine and Medicaid. In Baltimore, a
special capitated mental health network serves homeless, mentally ill people.
It provides mental health services, case management and housing. The
program has proved that it can keep people well and help them return to work
at a lower cost than the old Medicaid fee-for-service rate.119 Another
Baltimore program for pregnant substance-abusing women combines intensive
peer group support and obstetrical care.120 The program costs less than fee-forservice Medicaid, and results in a better life for mother and child.121
However, for managed care theory to work for welfare medicine, poor
people need to be able to settle into managed care systems to get the benefits of
a “stay healthy” approach. Preventive care is unlikely, as long as people rotate
from Medicaid managed care to the world of the uninsured and untreated.
Moreover, welfare medicine providers’ financial stability will remain
precarious as long as half their patients are “self-pays.”
119. See Charm City Capitation Covers Chronically Ill Residents, MANAGED BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH NEWS, June 13, 1996, at 4. See also Carol Wilkins, Building a Model Managed Care
System for Homeless Adults With Special Needs: The Health, Housing, and Integrated Services
Network, 2 CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC HEALTH 39 (1996) (describing a model capitated system
that delivers housing, health care and other services to formerly homeless, mentally ill people).
120. See Baltimore Program Uses Residents for Outreach, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
WEEK, Aug. 2, 1993, at 3.
121. Id.
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One option for reconstructing welfare medicine into a system that can take
advantage of what managed care has to offer is to expand insurance coverage
to provide more people with Medicaid, private health insurance and statefunded alternatives, thereby reducing the number of uninsured patients.122
States have increased flexibility to expand Medicaid eligibility without seeking
federal waivers. States may now offer Medicaid to working parents with
incomes approaching 150% of the federal poverty line.123 Also, they may offer
Medicaid to disabled people with incomes up to 250% of the federal poverty
line.124 The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) offers states
federal matching funding to insure children in households with incomes up to
200% of the federal poverty guideline through Medicaid or a separate
insurance program.125 An increase in the number of insured patients means
more financial stability for safety net providers. Expanded insurance coverage
also means that more people can be enrolled in MCOs or other systems that
focus on preventive and long-term care as well as acute care. Tennessee,

122. Medicaid and SCHIP expansions should be particularly attractive to states because it
allows them to match state expenditures with federal dollars. For every dollar spent on Medicaid
or SCHIP, the federal government contributes fifty to eighty-three cents. Medicaid expansions
leverage federal dollars without placing heavier costs on employers, health care providers or local
government entities. See MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note 35, at 1.
States can request section 1115 waivers to allow them to cover non-disabled adults and
other groups excluded from categorical eligibility by federal Medicaid law, and to raise income
eligibility guidelines above the limits set out in federal law. The only problematic part of the
section 1115 process is that states must show that the eligibility expansion will be cost-neutral in
terms of the federal Medicaid match. Nevertheless, states have made creative use of section 1115
waivers to dramatically expand Medicaid eligibility. Tennessee has used a section 1115 waiver to
expand Medicaid to cover everyone in the state with incomes up to 200% of poverty, and to allow
those with higher incomes to buy into the program. See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician
Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 205-06
n.143 (1995). Missouri’s section 1115 waiver allows it to cover children and pregnant women
with incomes up to 300% of poverty, and parents with incomes up to 100% of poverty.
Presentation for the Access to Health Committee of St. Louis 2004 (2000) (on file with the Saint
Louis University Law Journal). New York just unveiled a section 1115 Medicaid expansion to
cover one million additional working adults. New York Tries to Cover 1 Million Residents in
Ambitious Public and Private Initiatives, ST. HEALTH WATCH , Mar. 2000, at 9. Maine has a new
waiver that allows it to offer Medicaid to people with HIV who are not yet disabled and who can
stay healthy with the expensive drug therapy that Medicaid normally does not cover until a
person becomes disabled. Medicaid Expansion for HIV Begins in September in Maine, AIDS
POL’Y & L., Mar. 17, 2000, at 1.
123. See JOCELYN GUYER & CINDY MANN, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
UNINSURED, TAKING THE NEXT STEP: STATES CAN NOW TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FEDERAL
MEDICAID MATCHING FUNDS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE TO EXPAND HEALTH CARE COVERAGE TO
LOW-INCOME WORKING PARENTS 22 (1998), available at http://www.cbpp.org.
124. Disabled Workers Move Toward Broader Health Benefits in Current Medicaid
Expansion Bill, ST. HEALTH WATCH, Dec. 1999, at 1, 4.
125. 1999 Industry Outlook, supra note 110, at 14.
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Hawaii, Minnesota and Oregon are each experimenting with different ways of
accomplishing this goal.126
As a compliment to expanded coverage, another option is to pool large
numbers of Medicaid enrollees, preferably but not necessarily, with privately
insured patients and to funnel these patients to managed care entities that agree
to serve the uninsured as well as insured patients. Such a “tie-in” assures that
Medicaid patients will remain in the same system of care if they lose their
Medicaid coverage. Pooling these patients allows states to direct their nonMedicaid state and federal discretionary health spending to these new-style
safety net MCOs to help cover the cost of care for the uninsured.
Creating large pools of Medicaid enrollees, with or without privately
insured enrollees, makes good use of managed care theory. First, it allows for
continuity of care as people rotate from Medicaid to uninsured status. Second,
creating larger pools of patients makes the pooled enrollees more attractive to
HMOs. Commercial insurers shunned Medicaid when only a few patients
enrolled. When enrollment became mandatory and the number of potential
patients grew, commercial HMOs became more interested. Third, the larger
the pool the easier it is to average costs between high use and low use patients.
Finally, larger pools allow for economies of size and scale. A number of states
are limiting the number of Medicaid MCOs and authorizing special need
MCOs to create economies of scale and ensure continuity of care.
For example, in some areas California has limited Medicaid HMOs to one
per county while contracting with these welfare HMOs to provide other nonMedicaid welfare medical care services.127 These HMOs are county-organized
health systems (COHS), entities created by state statute and authorized by
several Medicaid waivers.128 The results are especially promising in Santa
Barbara County where the Santa Barbara Regional Health Authority HMO has
been called, “Medicaid in paradise; paradise in Medicaid.”129 The Authority
126. See generally JESSICA MITTLER ET. AL, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, MANAGED CARE AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS: FOUR YEARS’ EXPERIENCE

OREGON HEALTH PLAN (1999) (discussing the Oregon Health Plan), available at
http://www.kff.org/content/1999/2127/pub2127.pdf; ANNA AIZER ET AL., THE KAISER
COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND UNINSURED, MANAGED CARE AND LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS: FOUR YEARS’ EXPERIENCE WITH TENNCARE (1999) (discussing Tennessee’s
health care system), available at http://www.kff.org/content/1999/2129/pub2129.pdf; Pamela A.
Paul-Shaheen, The State and Health Care Reform: The Road Traveled and Lessons Learned from
Seven that Took the Lead, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 319 (1998) (discussing Hawaii’s and
Minnesota’s health care systems).
127. DEBBIE DRAPER ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MANAGED CARE AND LOW
INCOME POPULATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF MANAGED CARE IN CALIFORNIA 6 (1999), available
at http://www.kff.org.
128. Id.
129. Successful County Contracting in Santa Barbara Opens Door for Expansion, Medicare
Risk Product, ST. HEALTH WATCH, May 1999, at 8.
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consistently reports stellar clinical outcomes. One reason for the Authority’s
success is its large enrollment base: it covers virtually everyone who has
Medicaid, it is the sole county provider for prenatal care, and it is one of four
SCHIP providers in the county.130 With a large, solid funding base the
Authority can focus on preventive services and continuity of care.
Kentucky has gone one step further and designated its traditional welfare
medicine providers: public hospitals, teaching hospitals, and community
clinics, as the state’s only Medicaid HMOs.131 The state has sole-source
Medicaid contracts with HMOs organized by the state’s traditional safety net
providers.132 While the lack of choice of networks raises potential risks, sole
sourcing provides a stable funding base for traditional welfare medicine
providers and assures continuity of care for those who have always relied on
the welfare medicine system. Sole sourcing should also free money for
services and higher capitation rates that would otherwise be spent for
marketing and other administrative expenses.133
Massachusetts successfully uses sole-source welfare HMO contracting.
The state relies on a single HMO, the Massachusetts Behavioral Health
Partnership, to deliver mental health services to Medicaid enrollees and the
uninsured who, in the past, depended on the state’s public mental health
system.134 The state, the Partnership, and consumer advocates have worked
together to develop access, quality and outcome standards. The contract is
renewed annually allowing all parties the opportunity to examine the
Partnership’s performance and to fine-tune and improve the delivery system to
better meet the needs of its patients.135
Delivering better welfare medicine requires that HMOs be able to meet the
unique needs of those who rely most extensively on welfare medicine: the
elderly, those with physical and mental disabilities, people with chronic health
problems, those with spinal and head trauma, premature babies, and children
with special needs. In the past, Medicaid and other welfare medicine programs
have been hindered in helping these groups by restrictive and often illogical
benefit packages.

130. Id.
131. Kentucky Protects Traditional Providers In Its Rollout of the State’s Managed Medicaid
Program, ST. HEALTH WATCH, Nov. 1998, at 2.
132. Looking on the Bright Side of the Departure of Commercial Plans from Medicaid
Market, ST. HEALTH WATCH, Oct. 1999, at 7; Kentucky Protects Traditional Providers In Its
Rollout of the State’s Managed Medicaid Program, supra note 131, at 3.
133. Looking on the Bright Side of the Departure of Commercial Plans from Medicaid
Market, supra note 132, at 7.
134. Watson, supra note 54, at n.17.
135. For a description of how the contract has been modified to assure that the network better
meets the needs of chronically mentally ill people who are homeless, see generally Watson, supra
note 54, at nn.119-27.
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A shift to managed care, with capitated payments or global budgets, offers
an opportunity to alter and expand services to better meet the complex needs of
low income people, particularly the elderly and the disabled. It also offers the
ability to combine Medicaid funding with funding for targeted health services,
special education, housing and rehabilitation services to provide expanded and
more integrated services. The challenge is to stop thinking about Medicaid
managed care as merely a different way to fund medicine as usual. Instead, we
need to think creatively about how to pool funding sources to create new, more
responsive systems of care and benefit packages.
For example, the Missouri Interdepartmental Initiative for Children with
Severe Needs integrates the financing and delivery of community and homebased services for children with severe behavioral health needs who are at risk
of institutionalization, regardless of their eligibility for Medicaid.136
Historically, these children bounced around trying to patch together services
provided by six different divisions of state government. The Initiative
combines funding from each of these agencies, including Medicaid, into a
single capitated payment of $3199 per month per child, which is paid to the
Missouri Alliance for Children and Families, a for-profit corporation created
by ten community and residential care providers.137 The Alliance is
responsible for creating a network of medical and service providers. Case
managers, the key to the system, work with children and their families to direct
the delivery of comprehensive, integrated services. Although the system is not
expected to save money, the capitation rate is set to be budget neutral. The
hope is that services will shift from out-of-home residential settings to less
intensive settings, including the family home.138
Similarly, Iowa has combined Medicaid money with state and federal
mental health and substance abuse funds to create a Medicaid behavioral health
system that successfully integrates mental health and substance abuse services
and offers a broad array of previously uncovered services.139 The Iowa Plan
provides mental health and substance abuse coverage to approximately
180,000 residents, approximately eighty-five percent of those eligible for
Medicaid, using a single contractor, Merit Behavioral Care of Iowa, a forprofit corporation.140 Operated under a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver, the
system must be budget-neutral in its use of federal Medicaid funds, a goal the
state accomplished by combining Medicaid with other state and federal funds

136. Missouri Tries Capitated Payment System for Children with Behavioral Health Needs,
ST. HEALTH WATCH, Mar. 1999, at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Iowa Ignores Conventional Wisdon on Behavioral Health, ST. HEALTH WATCH,
Sept. 1999, at 1-2.
140. Id. at 1.
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targeted for mental health and substance abuse treatment.141 Commentators
conclude that Iowa’s behavioral health system has succeeded where others
have faltered because state officials had a clear vision of what they wanted,
worked closely with consumers, providers and the managed care contractor,
and proceeded slowly in building the system.142
Of course, for all its promise, managed care, with its capitated payments
and global budgets, carries the risk of under-service and cost-cutting to make
money. These risks become even more likely when states limit the number of
Medicaid and welfare HMOs or use sole-source contracting. The problems
that privately insured workers report, including delays and refusals of care and
treatment, are even more likely to occur in Medicaid and welfare capitated
systems where patients are less sophisticated consumers and less aggressive
advocates for their care. Medicaid and welfare managed care enrollees need
the same legal protections as privately insured workers: the right to dispute
care denials and a right to proceed against the HMO when services are denied.
One powerful way to guard against the risk of MCO cost cutting is the use
of performance criteria: financial penalties and bonuses tied to meeting
specific access standards, service requirements and outcome measures. For
example, in Kentucky, Medicaid HMOs get a one percent bonus for meeting
outcome measures like birth weight and immunizations.143 Iowa’s behavioral
managed care contract requires sixty performance standards, ten of which have
financial penalties or incentives attached.144 In Massachusetts, the mental
health HMO gets a financial bonus if it implements an Assertive Community
Treatment Team, an interdisciplinary team that takes mental health and social
services to hard to reach chronically mentally ill patients in the community and
that has been shown to be the most effective treatment modality for those who
are homeless or at risk of homelessness.145
Performance standards allow states to identify the services and outcomes
they want and to use financial incentives, rather than expensive law suits or
protracted administrative wrangling, to get them. Performance standards are
particularly appropriate in the managed care context which is founded on the
concept of using financial incentives to encourage preventive care and to
change old, ingrained patterns of service delivery. It helps MCOs and
providers think about systems of care rather than discrete services.
Yet, the biggest lesson to be learned from state experience with
commercial Medicaid managed care is to move slowly and to assure

141. See id. at 2.
142. See id. at 2-3.
143. Kentucky Plans Offered Financial Reward for Meeting Health Outcome Measures, ST.
HEALTH WATCH, Nov. 1998, at 8.
144. Iowa Ignores Conventional Wisdom on Behavioral Health, supra note 139, at 3.
145. Watson, supra note 54.
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contractors understand their responsibilities, networks are in place, and
enrollees understand the system. Detailed contracts that help everyone
understand the system and its obligations can help with this educational
process. States like Iowa that have taken time to work closely with
commercial HMOs report success.146 Others, like New York, which have
moved precipitously, report horror stories.147
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as neighborhoods are economically and racially segregated,
welfare medicine is likely to be an inevitable part of our health care system.
Quick fixes for Medicaid, including the wholesale commercialization of
Medicaid via commercial HMOs, are doomed to failure if they lose sight of
Medicaid’s role within the welfare medicine world. We need to remember that
Medicaid is only one part of a larger world of welfare medicine.
By focusing on a long-term relationship with primary care providers,
managed care offers much to cure what ails welfare medicine. Likewise,
capitated payments and global budgets offer financial incentives to move
welfare care away from acute, episodic service to preventive care. Tying large
numbers of Medicaid patients into substantial purchasing pools and combining
Medicaid funds with other government funding for health, social services and
housing offers the opportunity to expand services to better meet the needs of
welfare medicine patients. The challenge is to begin thinking of welfare
medicine as a sub-specialty and a unique system of care.

146. See id. at n.127.
147. See, e.g., John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Medicaid and Managed Care, 332
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1727, 1729-30 (1995) (discussing start-up problems in Arizona, Florida,
Tennessee, California and New York where states tried to move too quickly in Medicaid managed
care).

